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Abstract
 
Whether monarchy and democracy can coexist was the key question in both
Bhutan and Nepal during 2005. Two developments in Nepal will be major fac-
tors in determining the survival of the Shah dynasty and, in the longer term,
whether the Nepalese nation-state survives as a sovereign entity at all. These
were the “royal coup” of February 1 and the agreement between the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) and seven parliamentary political parties announced
on November 22. In Bhutan, a new constitution is out for consultation that
would establish a two-party democracy and reduce the powers of the king.
 
Nepal: Back to the Panchayat
 
On February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra declared a national
emergency; placed all of Nepal’s leading politicians under house arrest; shut
down the country’s phone system, internet servers, and FM radio stations; di-
verted international ﬂights; and imposed strong press censorship. He then as-
sumed the chairmanship of a handpicked 10-member Council of Ministers and
announced that he would exercise direct rule for three years. The coup, which
had been planned for months, was enforced by the Royal Nepalese Army, and
its effect was to bring the king back to the center of the political stage. Gya-
nendra was surprised by the international community’s negative reaction and
particularly by the hostile reception his move received in India.
Gyanendra knows that his father, Mahendra, had to weather a brief storm of
Indian opprobrium when he dismissed Nepal’s ﬁrst elected government in 1960,
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but then was able to build a system that excluded political parties. The 1962
Constitution enshrined the system of guided “Panchayat” (Council) democ-
racy that lasted until 1990. Gyanendra included three men in his Council of
Ministers who were hard-line zonal governors during the Panchayat period
and subsequently appointed two ex-Panchayat premiers as deputy chairmen.
Many observers were convinced that the coup marked merely the ﬁrst stage of
a process designed to return the country to the political conditions of 1962.
Developments since February have tended to bear this hypothesis out. For
instance, on February 18 Gyanendra ordered the establishment of a commission
to investigate political leaders and ofﬁceholders of all constitutional bodies,
despite the fact that a civil commission with this remit already existed. On
April 11, he reintroduced the post of Anchaladish (zonal administrator) in all
of Nepal’s 14 zones and ﬁve development regions. The old Panchayat-period
notion that Nepal could play its neighbors off against one another and thus
lessen the dominance of India, was revived, and representatives of the new
royal government embarked upon missions to China, Russia, and Pakistan.
Pakistan stated that it would support Nepal in safeguarding its sovereignty if
Nepal was threatened externally, while China offered $989,000 in military aid,
with further amounts to follow in subsequent years. New rules on news media
conduct imposed severe restrictions on independent journalism, hugely increased
the penalties for infringing existing rules, and prohibited any one group or in-
dividual from operating more than two types of media. This latter provision
was speciﬁcally aimed at the Kantipur Corporation, which operates a radio
station, television channel, and the country’s most inﬂuential newspaper. The
army conducted raids on the ofﬁces of a number of news organizations includ-
ing, most notoriously, the Kantipur and Sagarmatha FM radio stations. A new
code of conduct for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was introduced
in mid-November, prohibiting NGOs from receiving aid directly from donor
countries. A number of NGOs, foreign donors, and international watchdogs
denounced this move as a tool to curtail democratic and civil rights. Again, the
code represents a return to Panchayat-period policies.
King Gyanendra has announced that municipal elections will be held in
February 2006 and that general elections to form a new Parliament will take
place by mid-April 2007 at the latest. When the political parties said that they
would boycott any such elections under the current regime, the information
minister declared that the elections would be conducted on a partyless basis if
the parties did not participate.
The king, his Council of Ministers, and the generals of the Royal Nepalese
Army continue to believe that they can face down international criticism; the
freezing of all but non-lethal military aid by India, the U.K., and U.S.; an
armed Maoist insurgency; and growing agitation from both political parties
and mainstream civil society. It is unlikely that they are right.
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The Conflict with the Maoists and 
the 12-Point Agreement
 
The government retains control of the headquarters town of every district of
Nepal. In many districts, however, this is maintained only through a heavy
army presence; the Maoists remain the dominant force in the surrounding
rural areas. Until September 2005, the conﬂict continued much as before, with
casualties from low-intensity clashes reported every few days. There were also
two major Maoist assaults on Royal Nepalese Army bases. In the ﬁrst, on an
army base at Khara in Rukum District on April 7, the Maoists suffered serious
losses, but in the second, at Pili in Kalikot District on August 7, they inﬂicted
around 40 casualties and abducted about 50 security personnel. The Maoists’
capacity to mount assaults on this scale is not substantial: they possess proba-
bly no more than about 5,000 guns, many of which are very old, and they face
much greater ﬁrepower. However, there is very little possibility of the Royal
Nepalese Army defeating them. The Maoist army is self-sustaining and its
style of combat is strongly favored by the terrain in which it operates. The
Maoists know they cannot achieve a military victory over the Royal Nepalese
Army even if India, the U.S., and U.K. continue to freeze military aid. The
nature of this military stalemate is widely recognized outside the capital.
The king’s actions during the year encouraged greater unity between the
Maoists and the political parties that had been agitating against “royal regres-
sion” since October 2002. In order to hasten this rapprochement, the Maoists
announced a three-month unilateral ceaseﬁre beginning on September 3, 2005.
The government refused to reciprocate, arguing that the Maoists were simply
seeking an opportunity to regroup. A dialogue between the agitating parties
and the Maoists had begun in May and now quickened, concluding with a
meeting in Delhi on November 17 among the three most powerful Maoist
leaders (“Prachanda,” Baburam Bhattarai, and Krishna Bahadur Mahara) and
the leaders of the Nepali Congress Party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Uni-
ﬁed Marxist-Leninist), Janamorcha Nepal, and Unity Centre-Masal. The
agreement released on November 22 stated that “autocratic monarchy” was
the main obstacle to achieving peace, progress, and prosperity in Nepal. The
Maoists agreed to enter a multiparty political system, and it was agreed that an
elected assembly was the most acceptable forum for the necessary debate on
constitutional revisions. (The election of a constituent assembly has always
been the Maoists’ bottom line: all negotiations with the government to date
have foundered on this question, and it is the one demand that the palace is un-
likely ever to concede.) Both sides admitted to unspeciﬁed mistakes and short-
comings and called for impartial outside assistance in supervising elections
and overseeing the cantonment of state and Maoist forces. The agreement did
not contain a commitment from the Maoists to disarm; it acknowledged that
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there had been no agreement on the parties’ demand for the restoration of Par-
liament. A restored Parliament would simply return Nepal to the status quo
ante in terms of political representation, i.e., the Maoists would not be in-
cluded in it. In contrast, the Maoists would expect to be strongly represented
in a constituent assembly. While a restored Parliament could be expected to
amend the Constitution, a constituent assembly would set out to rewrite it in
its entirety.
On December 2, the CPN (Maoist) announced a further one-month exten-
sion of its unilateral ceaseﬁre, which suggests that it wishes to continue its dis-
cussions with other parties. The announcement was made just as the king
returned from a tour of African states––on which occasion civil servants were
instructed to line the streets to welcome the monarch home, as they did on a
regular basis before 1990. The nature of the program of joint activity against
the “autocratic monarchy” was not speciﬁed in the November agreement, but
it is likely to focus on obstructing the elections scheduled to be conducted in
the government-held district headquarters in February 2006. If the government
presses ahead with its plans for these elections, this could lead to a serious
escalation in violence over the winter.
 
Bhutan
 
In Bhutan, meanwhile, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck has problems that are
the stuff of his royal neighbor’s dreams. On March 26, 2005, the long awaited
draft Constitution was released for consultation. This declares Bhutan to be a
“democratic constitutional monarchy.” The most signiﬁcant change that will
be brought about if and when this Constitution is promulgated will be the le-
galization of political parties, although the number of these is effectively lim-
ited to two: one in government, one in opposition. The Constitution enshrines
human rights, civic responsibilities, and the pursuit of “gross national happi-
ness,” but debars from government or constitutional ofﬁce any individual (in-
cluding a prospective monarch) who is married to a non-Bhutanese. It has
been argued that the Constitution’s most serious shortcoming is its refusal to
accommodate Bhutan’s ethnic and linguistic diversity; this is an issue that will
attain much greater salience if freer public debate is one of the products of
constitutional reform, as was the case in Nepal after 1990.
Bhutan’s relations with India remained as warm as ever, and King Jigme
was the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations in Delhi in January 2005.
India’s assistance to Bhutan for its ninth Five-Year Plan was increased by over
50%, and agreements were reached on a number of issues, including establish-
ment of a rail link between the two countries. No progress whatsoever was
made on the question of the 120,000 Bhutanese refugees in southeast Nepal.
King Jigme declared during his visit to Delhi that very few of them were
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Bhutanese citizens and that Bhutan was under no obligation to take back even
those who were. His Indian hosts were too polite to remind him that his own
ofﬁcials had participated in a veriﬁcation exercise in one of the refugee camps,
which had concluded that over 75% of the camp’s inhabitants actually were
Bhutanese citizens at the point of their departure from Bhutan.
The Bhutan envisaged by the drafters of its new Constitution will be a some-
what freer country than hitherto and its citizens will have more rights. The con-
sultation process has already provoked pro-monarchical and anti-democratic
protests, which give the government an excuse to introduce amendments if it
so chooses. While a new constitutional order would not bring the refugees
home, it should help to guard against a recurrence of the kind of crisis that
forced them to ﬂee. Meanwhile, if the Maoists and the parties continue to
make common cause in Nepal, the possibility that the palace will attempt
to impose a new Constitution on Nepal should not be wholly ruled out. But no
Constitution drafted by King Gyanendra would receive as polite a reception as
that accorded the Constitution handed down by King Jigme.
